The legislative success of governments in Latin America has been explained by two main theories. For some authors, the main explanation involves the proactive and reactive powers of the chief executive. Other scholars argue that negotiations with deputies for portfolios and pork are the most important factors behind success in approving legislation. This paper proposes an innovative methodological strategy to test the mechanisms behind each of these theories. Original survey data of 12 Brazilian state-level assemblies is examined to assess elites' attitudes in regard to governors' strategies to obtain legislative support. Results suggest that there is not a unique equilibrium to the problem of coalition formation in multiparty settings. Deputies with concentrated constituencies, from more decentralized parties, and from conservative parties, tend to believe that the most efficient way a governor can obtain legislative support is to negotiate amendments with deputies. On the other hand, the more scattered a legislator's constituency and the more liberal or centralized his or her party, the more likely a deputy is to think that governors achieve better legislative success when they negotiate cabinet positions.
Introduction
The legislative success of governments in Latin America more broadly, and in Brazil in particular, has been explained by two main theories. For some authors, the main explanation involves the proactive and reactive powers of the chief executive, which gives him a central role in formulating and conducting the government's agenda (Aleman and Tsebelis 2002; Figueiredo and Limongi 1999; Morgenstern 2004; Santos 2003; ) . Other scholars believe, however, that negotiations with deputies for portfolios and pork -along with the need to form coalitions and cabinets -are the most important factors (Altman 2000; Ames 2001; Amorim Neto 2006a; Amorim Neto and Santos 2003; Inacio 2006; Nunes, 2011; Pereira and Mueller 2004; Raile et al. 2010; Zucco Jr. 2009 ). Although these approaches have contributed to the understanding of political reality in many places, I
propose here an innovative methodological strategy to test the mechanisms behind each of these theories.
Instead of observing how legislators vote when the government presents its agenda, I evaluate the conditions under which legislative support may be obtained based on elites' attitudes in regard to governors' strategies to obtain legislative support. The paper, therefore, does not intend to explain the degree of legislative success of presidents or governors, but presents empirical evidence showing that success varies considerably because legislators' attitudes to the executive also vary. In accordance with Power and Zucco Jr. (2011) , I also believe that the views of parliamentarians give us an unique interpretation of the behavioral data we have access to. In their own words, "although revealed preferences are often more reliable than stated preference, the views of parliamentarians can tell us about the interpretation of the behavioral data. After all, self-perceptions of legislators and their evaluations of the national political reality enable a rich contextualization of the behaviors observed in the floor." (Power and Zucco 2011, 10) I believe successful negotiations occur when the governor can offer legislators and political parties the resources they care most about. It is not accurate to assume that there is only one strategy that would appeal to all legislators. As deputies have different electoral backgrounds and are members of different party organizations, one could suppose that such features would determine the preferences of each actor, and therefore, his behavior. A successful chief executive should realize that different legislators need different resources. What I propose in this paper is a research design to evaluate which legislators' features would produce an easier (or harder) setting for executives intending to approve their agendas based on legislators' attitudes. Such an idea cannot be assessed by behavioral data, but can be approximated by surveys with legislative elites. To accomplish this, I have collected data from a survey rolled in twelve Brazilian subnational states between bpsr Felipe Nunes 2007 and 2008 . 1 Therefore, I was able to identify the stated preferences of legislators -as expressed in their opinions -which should suggest how Brazilian governors would get the biggest "bang for their buck" when they offer partners the resources that maximize their expected votes.
2
Given that politicians care greatly about electoral success, and that they only have their time in office to convince voters to support them, I argue that the degree to which a legislator is convinced to support the governor's agenda depends on the governor's ability to give him or her a "great deal" -meaning that the offer matches up and satisfies that legislator's demand. That is, the success of a government will depend on the capacity of a governor to (1) find information on the desires and needs of his or her potential allies, (2) distribute and/or share political power and resources according to this information, and (3) dictate how resources will be offered to his or her allies. In the investigation, I identify patterns that could explain why certain coalitions happen to be successful, while others fail. 3 This is not to say that attitude data is superior to behavioral data, but simply that the complementation of each other produces a wider perspective.
The first task in this empirical project is to check whether there is, in fact, variation among legislators' perceptions of the utility of different political resources controlled by the governor. More specifically, I investigate whether legislators prefer to receive one kind of resource instead of another from the chief executive. After that, my focus shifts to identifying which features of legislators and political parties influence deputies' opinions about their relationship with the Executive. I use a Multinomial Logit Model to estimate the effect of (1) the type of the deputy's constituency, (2) the degree of the deputy's party centralization, and (3) the ideological position of the party of which the deputy is a member has on that deputy's opinion of "the best strategy that a governor can pursue to obtain legislative support." I find that there is no unique solution to the problem of coalition formation in multiparty settings. In fact, the chief executive must find an ideal strategy for different kinds of players, and this is what makes the strategic game between them so interesting to study.
In sum, my results show that members with concentrated constituencies, from more decentralized parties, and from conservative parties, tend to believe that the most efficient way a governor can obtain legislative support is to negotiate amendments with deputies.
On the other hand, the more scattered a legislator's constituency and the more liberal or centralized his or her party, the more likely a deputy is to think that governors achieve better legislative success when they negotiate cabinet positions. This is an important point, as the use of strategies to mobilize political or budgetary resources strongly depends on the relationship between the government's agenda and the preferences of the actors in play. As Cheibub et al. (2004) have shown, a chief executive will only have incentives to share power if the preferences of the actors needed to achieve a majority and approve the agenda do not match those of the executive. The authors call the attention to the negotiation over the content of policies voted in the legislature. If the parties agree on a certain topic, then the president may not need to negotiate patronage or pork with deputies/parties in exchange for support of that policy. The ideological position and the preferences of the political party will determine the likelihood of a deputy to support the policy in question.
Assuming that the political distance between political parties is given, the work of Amorim Neto (2006b) builds on our knowledge of the connection between presidential success and the operational conditions under which it is achieved. The author discusses the main incentives motivating an actor (individual or collective) in a coalition cabinet.
According to Amorim Neto, the distribution of offices in the cabinet will depend on the volume of the resources mobilized by the president, the power of the Legislative against the Executive, and the individual legislator's ability to pursue an Executive position without losing his or her opportunity to win future legislative elections. Amorim Neto's expectations vary depending on features inherent to the negotiation. given, and they will try to maximize their expectations given their preference ordering.
The challenge is to identify what determines a legislator's preferences.
Studies have postulated that political parties have three main types of objectives in modern democracies: votes, offices and policies (Strom 1990; Mueller and Strom 1999) .
However, the most interesting finding of such models is the interaction among each of these dimensions. Building on Strom's arguments, I posit that it is in the interest of parties, after they reached office, to obtain pork and policies that are compatible with their constituency's preferences. Therefore, I expect that a member's propensity to support the government in the legislature is directly related to the sort of resources they are offered by the governor. In other words, the preferences of legislators are constituted and constrained by their constituencies' preferences.
However, political parties are also the source of preferences for legislators. Legislators come together in a party through a shared interest in office (Aldrich 1995) when they agree on policy (Cohen et al. 2008) . Thus, the preferences of individual legislators will reflect the ideology shared by the group that constitutes their party, either locally or nationally. As several papers have shown, ideology is still a key distinguisher of politicians in Brazil (Castro et al. 2009; Power and Zucco Jr. 2009 ), although ideology's influence on roll call votes has diminished over time (Zucco Jr. 2009 ). Thus, it is reasonable to believe that ideology is still a good proxy for what legislators wish for.
Second, obtaining the support of player X depends on the way that the government negotiates with X. The difference between hierarchical or horizontal relationships can often determine the satisfaction with a job or a deal (Glisson and Durick 1988) . Thus, the manner a negotiation is pursued can influence whether an agreement is ultimately obtained. More often than not, however, the most important determinant of success is not the approach of the negotiation, but rather the formal and informal structures of the organization in question (Campbell et al. 2004) . In the government case, the internal organization of each party, the party system, and the degree of legislative centralization constrain the president's negotiation strategies. Strong party systems tend to generate more programmatic negotiations between the players in the competition (Sartori 1987 Regarding political parties, the more centralized they are, the larger their staff, the higher their internal cohesion, and the more important party leaders will be, therefore, they will intervene more in negotiations (Cox 2005; Mair 2006 ). According to Mair (2006) , parties will become weaker in the electoral arena but stronger in the parliamentary arena under these conditions. This empowerment of parties in the legislature made the larger parties inclined to enlarge their programmatic connections and to enrich their internal structure, giving more coordination capabilities to party leaders. Cox (2005) shows how the "state of nature" in legislatures has bad implications for a government's functionality:
without coordination by party leaders and chairs, Congress tends to be held hostage by filibusters. Thinking of the legislature as a company, as suggested by Weingast and Marshall (1988) , leads many legislatures to try to create an institutional structure that can generate gains through trade in a continuous decision-making process with low transactional costs (North 1990 ). This may result in a robust link between the structure of parties and the preferences of legislators for various kinds of political negotiations.
Finally, when making deals, the relationship between legislators and the executive is dependent on the ideological position of the actors in the negotiation. A one-dimensional ideological spectrum is the classic structure used to understand political behavior. I believe that it helps to understand the phenomenon that is analyzed here in two ways: first, parties from different ideological orientations tend to have different types of constituencies (Ames 2001; Carvalho 2003; Nunes 2009; Zucco Jr. 2009 ); second, coalitions with parties that are closer ideologically tend to produce more consistent and long-term legislative results. As Iversen and Soskice (2006) show, center-left governments dominate under PR systems, and they also tend to redistribute more. The mechanism behind the argument is that coalitions representing the poor and the middle class are easier to be formed in proportional representation systems than in majoritarian ones. So, it is reasonable to believe that constituencies of left-centered governments are different from the constituencies of right-centered governments. The position of the partners along the one-dimensional spectrum also matters. As argued by Inacio (2006), coalitions in which the inclusion of participants was based on the smallest ideological distance, and were constructed ensuring a minimum enlargement of the cabinet, demonstrate higher presidential legislative success.
Under these circumstances, it is easier to solve coordination problems that result from the heterogeneity of the players' preferences. 
Opinions about Coalition Formation Strategies
What the literature has forgotten so far, however, is that what is negotiated and how it is negotiated between the Executive and the Legislative may depend on certain factors that may be a function of a legislator political profile and/or a party organization. To assess potential features that might determine how a coalition should be composed, I will use attitude information based on a survey applied to the political elite. In summary, I claim legislators' constituency types and ideological positions dictate the type of resources they care most about, while the degree of centralization adopted in their political parties influences their preferences for the form of negotiation with the executive. Such theoretical expectations should be investigated empirically in order to check their validity.
Instead of observing directly, I will investigate such associations based on deputies' stated preferences and characteristics. I also believe that parties and the individual attributes of parliamentarians impact the structure of their preferences. Therefore, my analytical strategy will be to search for connections between these member's features and their opinions is based on a survey conducted in 12 Brazilian Assemblies. If variation within and between the states in parliamentarians' opinions about the efficiency of the governors' strategies in obtaining legislative support is found, I expect this will be associated with his or her electoral-party profile.
The electoral-party profile of parliamentarians refers particularly to (1) his or her constituency, (2) the degree of centralization of his or her political party, and (3) the ideological position of the party he or she is a member. I expect that a variation of these three dimensions will affect the parliamentarians' opinion on the efficiency of the governor's strategies in the following directions:
• When referring to political parties, the following reasoning applies: the more centralized they are, the more important party leaders will be, and therefore, the more they will intervene in negotiations (Mair 2006; Cox 2005) . These conclusions should lead us to expect that cabinets will be formed when leaders are decisive and strong in controlling their benchmark behavior, while pork will be determinant when parties are decentralized and undisciplined.
Although these hypotheses are presented as separate options, I also treat them in interaction with each other in the empirical test. By doing so, I expect to observe which systematic effects are due to exclusive or complementary interaction of variables. I believe, for example, that the importance of a leader to the composition of a cabinet could annul the effect of ideology when a leftist legislator is a member of a centralized party. used in such a way , and I believe they can add information that has been neglected so far.
It is hard to test the arguments I propose here using observational data on roll call voting. The result of an aggregation of votes does not tell us how the aggregation of preferences was produced as it only shows the final position taken by legislators. With my research strategy, I will be able to identify deputies' preferred relationships with other deputies, with the executive, with other partisan partners, and finally with their constituencies. This method circumvents the limits of roll call analysis, which only captures the last step of the relationship between legislators and the president. I overcome this limitation by using the deputies' expectations of their relationship with the president. By doing so, I hope to be identifying the mechanisms that tend to produce successful aggregation of majorities in legislative bodies as a function of the chief executive strategy to build them.
Of the 624 deputies that constituted the universe of analysis, 513 answered the questionnaire. This research project gained attention because of the lack of studies on subnational legislatives in Brazil and the need to produce an analysis that could contribute to the knowledge of the behavior, processes, and legislative law-making in the federated states. All political regions of Brazil were represented in the sample, including the follow- The questionnaire contained 112 questions and the answers were collected face-toface. The researchers involved in the project traveled to each state and interviewed all legislators in person at their offices. Appointments were made in order to guarantee availability for the interviews, which lasted around 40 minutes each. No one else was present in the office during the interviews. All personal information of legislators was undisclosed and no information was associated with specific names. All legislators signed an agreement allowing the researchers to conduct the interview under these conditions. All state legislators were contacted but some of them refused to participate in the research and, therefore, are not in the sample. To avoid selection bias in my results, I ran a logit model to check whether being in or out of the sample (dependent variable) was associated with any of my independent variables. None of the coefficients were statistically significant, which suggests that I am using a sufficiently randomized sample.
The Dependent Variable: Strategy to Obtain Legislative Support
The questionnaire had two questions that dealt specifically with the obtainment of legislative support. The first one concerned the way in which the governor negotiates with the legislature: with party leaders or individual legislators. The second question is about the kind of resources used by the governor to obtain legislative support: office positions or pork appropriations. In order to test my hypothesis I recoded both questions into one in such a way that all choices I am interested in were covered. 7 The results are presented in There is significant variation in the legislators' opinion of the most efficient strategy to obtain legislative support. Most members believe that the most efficient strategy is the negotiation of pork appropriations with party leaders, followed by portfolio negotiation with party leaders and negotiation of pork with individual legislators. The table also reveals the legislators' preference for negotiations involving party leaders: 52.4% of deputies believe this is the governor's best strategy to obtain legislative support. This evidence supports the argument that political parties also matter in subnational assemblies (Nunes 2009 ).
We can also observe variation of legislators' opinions by state assembly (see Figure   1 ). The deputies of the two largest states in Brazil, São Paulo (SP) and Minas Gerais (MG), believe the governor's best strategy to obtain legislative support is to negotiate pork with party leaders. Legislators from highly competitive states (Castro et al. 2009 ), such as Bahia (BA) and Rio Grande do Sul (RS), however, believe cabinet formation is the best strategy. In poor states like Ceará (CE) and Tocantins (TO), the negotiation of pork with individual legislators seems to be the most widely chosen option. 
Figure 1. Governor's Strategies to Obtain Legislative Support by State

Independent Variables: Constituencies, Ideology and Party Centralization
As previously indicated, I expect that legislators' opinions about the Executive's most efficient strategy to obtain legislative support will vary in three dimensions: (1) type of constituency, (2) degree of centralization of the political party, and (3) type of relationship between government and opposition, (3) first term, (4) gender, and (5) schooling years. The summary of the variables is presented in Table 3 below. 
Multinomial Logit Model
When a dependent variable is discrete (such as governor's strategy to obtain legislative support), OLS estimation is not appropriate because basic assumptions of OLS are violated, as shown by Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1981) and Greene (2008) . To avoid these problems, researchers convert the discrete variable -the executive's strategy for dealing with legislators, in this case -into a continuous variable, such as the probability of preferring one strategy to another. The next step is to choose an appropriate functional form to estimate this probability. A linear probability model may underestimate the true regression slope when there are many observations characterized by extreme values of choice probability (0 and 1). This specification bias cannot be corrected by using a nonlinear estimation procedure, however. Given that all probabilities lie between 0 and 1, the use of the cumulative probability function should provide the most acceptable transformation.
Because the number of strategies available to governors to obtain legislative support (my dependent variable) is greater than four, a multinomial qualitative model would render useful information that is somewhat different from that obtained in binary logit or probit models. Therefore, I could choose to implement either a multinomial logit or probit model. The multinomial probit has some attractive features, including a normally distributed error term, easily interpreted results, and the provision of general patterns of cross-elasticity (King 1998; Greene 2008; Wooldridge 2010) . However, the multinomial probit can be applied only when there is a small number of alternatives (usually three) because for categories of four or more, numerical integration is too costly for practical application in iterating likelihood maximization (McFadden 1984) . For example, multivariate integrals are required for many alternatives. Therefore, this technique may not be appropriate to analyze the determinants of a governor's strategy as this would involve five different categories in this analysis.
On the other hand, given its relative computational ease, multinomial logit has been widely used, even though the error term has a logistic distribution and the restrictions of the "independence of irrelevant alternatives" assumption (Wooldridge 2010). My goal in this paper is to use the multinomial logit (MNL) model to identify the major determinants of the opinions that legislators have concerning the governor's strategies to achieve legislative success.
Let y denote a random variable taking on the values {0,1,...,J} where J is a positive integer, and let x denote a set of conditioning variables. For example, if y denotes governor's strategies to obtain legislative support, x can contain things like constituency type, ideology, political parties centralization and gender. I assume that ( x i , y i ) is a random draw from the population. As in binary response models, we are interested in how changes in bpsr What is the Best Strategy to Obtain Legislative Support? Survey Evidence from Brazilian State Assemblies the elements of x affect the response probabilities, P(y = j | x), j = 0,1,2,....,J . Since the probabilities must sum to 1, P(y = 0 | x) is determined once we know the probabilities for j = 1, .... J. Let x be a 1 times K vector with first element unity. The multinomial logit model (MNL) has response probabilities
where b j is K times 1, j = 1, ...., J. And because the response probabilities must sum to 1, Then, we estimate the log of the odds of one strategy versus another as a linear function of the explanatory variables.
Empirical Results
The empirical results of the multinomial logit estimation are shown in Table 3 . To make interpretation easier, I have calculated the log-odds for the substantive comparison that I want to make here, i.e. the comparison between D, negotiation of pork with deputies, and E, negotiations of portfolios with party leaders (see last column in Table 4 ). Formally speaking, such comparison is possible given that the coefficients that we estimate using the MNL method can be interpreted as the effects on the log of the odds ratio between bpsr Felipe Nunes each given category and the excluded category. Therefore, we can find the difference between two categories by subtracting their log-odds from one to another (Greene 2008) . Log-odds for Portfolio-leader/Pork-deputy estimated by non-parametric bootstrap in R 2.15.
The MNL model predicts that legislators with concentrated constituencies tend to believe the best strategy for the governor to obtain legislative support is to negotiate pork with individual deputies. The model also predicts that legislators with scattered constituencies tend to believe that the governor's best strategy to obtain legislative support is by means of negotiating portfolios -meaning building a multiparty cabinet. The centralization of a political party is associated with strategy A, negotiation of portfolios with deputies. Finally, conservative legislators tend to prefer negotiations of pork. The general outcome for constituency and ideology is consistent with my expectations, but the effect of centralization is not strong enough to be conclusive (see Table 4 ).
But more important than the results of the four first columns in Table3 is the direct comparison between the negotiation of pork with deputies and the negotiation of portfolios with party leaders (see column C/D in Table 4 What do these results suggest after all? First, the three dimensions explored in this work affect the probability of a parliamentary opinion on the governor's best strategy to obtain legislative support. As expected, the profile of legislators seems to influence their opinions about the relationship with the executive. This may imply, consequentially, that the profile of deputies also influences the utility functions of legislators when negotiating 
Final Considerations
This paper examined the hypothesis that the opinion legislators form about the most efficient strategy for a governor to obtain legislative support is linked to his political profile. Rather than explaining the composition of a government coalitions only through the lens of its own characteristics, such as ideological contiguity, size of opposition, number of parties, or different types of offices, this paper has shown that governors must concern themselves with the characteristics of their potential allies in coalitions as well. Studying the legislators' profiles can help governors to build efficient coalitions, where more political support is gained for a lower price.
Another contribution of this paper relies on the estimates provided by a multinomial logit model using survey data from legislators in Brazilian State Assemblies. There are several benefits of using a survey for this kind of analysis and the most salient is to overcome the limits of roll call data. With a survey, the researcher captures better the sincere preference of legislators, something almost impossible to obtain from roll call votes. The survey also allows the researcher to create specific questions to capture nuances that have empirical and theoretical importance. By using roll calls, a researcher is limited to examining the legislator's ex post facto preferences.
The first interesting pattern I presented concerned the variation of legislator's opinions on the governor's best strategies to obtain legislative support. Although a majority prefers negotiations of pork with party leaders, all five categories have similar proportions.
The analysis also called the attention to the importance that legislators ascribe to political parties. More than 50% of legislators believe that parties are the best way to successful negotiations between the Executive and the Legislative. In future research, I would like to investigate the residual strategies that were recoded into one category. In conclusion, my results point towards an analytical perspective that takes into account not only discrete choices, but interactive ones as well. Instead of seeing presidents or governors as players trying to maximize one or the other strategy, my empirical outcomes suggest that they do both at the same time. Pork is more efficient for some allies whereas portfolios are more useful to others. Some prefer direct negotiations and others believe that the best strategy to build a successful coalition is to form a multiparty cabinet. In other words, different allies are attracted by different offers, therefore this leads executives to choose optimal strategies for different negotiations. This result directly contradicts the notion that only one strategy prevails in all cases. The received wisdom from the existing literature missed most of the complexity that involves negotiations between the executive and the legislature, especially in fragmented party systems.
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